Opinion No. 94-10
May 16, 1994
TOPIC: Judge's obligation to report an attorney to the ARDC after having
found the attorney in direct criminal contempt of the court.
DIGEST: A finding of contempt may constitute an appropriate disciplinary
measure, making further measures (i.e., notification to the ARDC) discretionary.
REFERENCES: Illinois Supreme Court Rule 63(B)(3) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, Canon 3, (145 Ill.2d R.63); Rules 8.3 and 8.4 of the Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct. See also Illinois Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion 93-1.
FACTS
An attorney insists that she should be allowed to personally question
prospective jurors during voir dire. The judge informs the attorney that only he
will be asking the questions. The attorney refuses to try the case if she is not
allowed to question the venire panel. The judge holds the attorney in criminal
contempt and sentences her to twenty-four hours incarceration.
QUESTION
Is the judge required to report the attorney's conduct to the Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission?
OPINION
Supreme Court Rule 63B(3) states that "a judge having knowledge of . . . a
violation of Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct on the part of a lawyer
shall take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures." The attorney in this case
may have violated subsections (a)(3) and/or (a)(5) of Rule 8.4. Subsection (a)(3)
prohibits a lawyer from "commit{ting} a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects."
Criminal contempt is considered to be a crime. People ex rel. Kunce v. Hogan, 37
Ill. App. 3d 673, 683 (1976). Although the lawyer's conduct in question does not
reflect adversely on her "honesty" or "trustworthiness," it may arguably call into
question her "fitness as a lawyer." The lawyer's conduct here could also possibly
be characterized as "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice" as
prohibited by subsection (a)(5) of Rule 8.4. Therefore, the judge in this case may
have been obligated pursuant to Rule 63B(3) to take some disciplinary measures.
Even if the judge in this case was required to take disciplinary measures,
notification to the ARDC would probably be unnecessary given the fact that the
judge already addressed the attorney's misconduct through his finding of criminal
contempt. Rule 63B(3) does not require that a judge having knowledge of a
lawyer's misconduct report the misconduct to the ARDC. The Rule simply
requires that the judge "initiate appropriate disciplinary measures." The
Committee Comments to the Rule state, "Where misconduct by an attorney is
involved, a finding of contempt may, in appropriate circumstances, constitute the
initiation of appropriate disciplinary measures." See also People v. Camden, 210
Ill. App. 3d 921 (1991), Freeman v. Myers, 191 Ill. App. 3d 223 (1989) (both
cases recognizing that attorney misconduct may be appropriately addressed by the
trial court through a finding of contempt).
In conclusion, the contempt order in this case was an appropriate
disciplinary action taken by the trial court. Although it is within the judge's
discretion to report the misconduct to the ARDC, such further action is not
required in this case.