Opinion No. 95-5
March 7, 1995
TOPIC: Duty of a judge to disqualify himself or herself when a lawsuit is filed
accusing the judge of misconduct or when a complaint is filed against the judge
with the Judicial Inquiry Board (JIB).
DIGEST: A judge is not obligated to disqualify himself or herself from a
proceeding merely because a party's lawyer has filed a suit against the judge
accusing the judge of misconduct or has filed a complaint against the judge with
the JIB.
REFERENCES: Illinois Supreme Court Rules 63A(5) and 63C(1)(a) of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 (145 Ill.2d R. 63); In re Marriage of Hartian,
222 Ill.App.3d 566, 584 N.E.2d 245 (1st Dist. 1991); Lena v. Commonwealth, 340
N.E.2d 884, 886-87 (Mass. 1976); State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320 (Iowa 1976).
FACTS
Judge hears a case and renders a decision. Later, a participating lawyer files
a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court against the judge and others for misconduct.
Shortly thereafter, the lawyer moves to reconsider the judge's decision.
QUESTIONS
1. Must the judge disqualify himself or herself from hearing a motion for
reconsideration of a case when a participating lawyer has filed a federal lawsuit
for misconduct against the judge and others subsequent to the original decision of
the case by the judge?
2. Would the result be different if, instead, the complaint about the judge
was made to the JIB?
OPINIONS
1
A judge is not required to disqualify himself or herself from a proceeding
merely because a participating lawyer has filed a misconduct suit against the
judge. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 63C(1) mandates a judge's disqualification
from a proceeding only where the judge's impartiality might "reasonably" be
questioned. Rule 63C(1)(a) further specifies a mandated disqualification where
the judge has a "personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer."
The judge should first consult his or her own emotions and conscience and
pass what has been called an "internal test of freedom" from disabling conflicts.
(See Lena v. Commonwealth, 340 N.E.2d 884, 886-87 (Mass. 1976); State v.
Smith, 242 N.E.2d 320 (Iowa 1976).) Next, the judge should attempt an objective
appraisal of whether the subject matter is a proceeding in which his or her
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In connection therewith, the judge
must give consideration to whether the lawyer's lawsuit is a ploy, an act of
"judge-shopping".
Ordinarily, any bias or prejudice that is generated in the context of court
proceedings will not serve as grounds requiring judicial disqualifications.
Mandatory disqualification would usually only be required when the kind of bias
or prejudice exhibited by the judge arose out of some extrajudicial source.
Though an easy and "safe" way out might be for the judge to disqualify
himself or herself in the circumstances posed here, consideration must be given to
the system being served. Another judge might not always be available. Given
that there is at issue here a motion for reconsideration, a new judge would not
usually have the benefit of all of the nuances of the case. Moreover, Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 63A(5) requires that a judge "should dispose promptly of the
business of the court".
An analogy might be drawn to a comment a judge makes during
proceedings. Such a comment might give the appearance of partiality to the
adversely affected party. In fact, the comment might strongly suggest bias and if
heard by a jury would be an improper expression of an opinion on the evidence.
However, the same comment made outside the presence of the jury might well not
require the disqualification of the judge. By analogy, though the lay public might
have difficulty accepting that the judge can be fair and render justice even though
a "charge" has been brought against him or her, the professionalism of the judge
will determine whether he or she can be fair and impartial and render justice first
to the parties and secondly to the participating lawyers.
2
A judge would not be mandated to disqualify himself or herself from a
proceeding merely because a participating lawyer has lodged a complaint about
the judge with the Judicial Inquiry Board (JIB). As noted in the Opinion above,
judicial disqualification is mandated only where the judge's impartiality might be
reasonably questioned and if in fact the judge were personally biased or prejudiced
against a party or the party's lawyer. Mere "allegations" or "charges" of judicial
partiality or bias will not suffice to mandate judicial disqualification.
The Illinois Appellate Court has rejected a party's contention that his or her
complaint against a trial judge, filed with the Judicial Inquiry Board, was evidence
of an extrajudicial source of bias or prejudice and, without more, therefore
required judicial disqualification and a change of venue. The Court, in In re
marriage of Hartian, 222 Ill.App.3d 566, 584 N.E.2d 245 (1st Dist. 1991),
determined that allegedly erroneous findings and ruling by the trial court were not
sufficient reasons to establish that the court had a personal bias or prejudice
against the complaining party. The Court noted at 584 N.E.2d 247: "To allow a
change of venue under these circumstances would create a dangerous precedent
whereby those seeking venue changes need only file charges with the Judicial
Inquiry Board to achieve that purpose."