2015-01: Participation in a law enforcement agency’s “ride-along” program.

Opinion No. 15-01

October 19, 2015

 

Topic:   Participation in a law enforcement agency’s “ride-along” program.

 

Digest: Participation in a law enforcement agency’s “ride-along” program compromises the appearance of judicial impartiality and is therefore impermissible.

 

References: Illinois Supreme Court Rules 62A and 62B; Committee Commentary to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 62; United States v. Frankenthal, 582 F.2d 1102, 1108 (7th Cir. 1978); Illinois Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion No. 01-08 (2001); Delaware Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion No. 1998-4 (1998); New York Advisory Committee. on Judicial Ethics Opinion No. 03-45 (2003); Utah Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion No. 97-5 (1997).

 

Facts

A police department permits public officials and other community members to “ride-along” with a police officer during the officer’s work shift. The program is intended to educate the public about law enforcement procedures and operations. Several judges wish to participate in the “ride along” program.

Issue

May a judge participate in a police “ride-along” program?

Opinion

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 62A declares that judges must conduct themselves “at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 62A. Rule 62 applies to both the professional and personal activities of a judge and prohibits conduct that appears to compromise judicial impartiality as well as conduct that in fact compromises judicial impartiality. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 62A cmt. (“A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety.”).

In honoring this essential principle of judicial ethics, a judge must refrain from any activity that could lead the reasonable observer to conclude that the judge favors a particular category of lawyer, litigant, witness, or other constituent of the criminal justice system. Thus, the Committee has advised judges not to hold memberships in a specialty bar association representing the partisan interests of one set of litigants. Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm. Op. 01-08 (2001). Riding with a police officer similarly carries the risk of creating an appearance of partiality because the public could reasonably interpret participation in the ride along program as aligning the judge with the interests of law enforcement. As observed by the Delaware Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee:

An independent and impartial judiciary must be vigilant constantly not to convey to the public that the line of demarcation between the judiciary and the law enforcement agencies is eroded. A judge sitting in a police car on a “ride along” would appear to blur the separation the public expects between judges and the arresting agencies . . . and the public could perceive an erosion of the impartiality expected of all judges.

Del. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 1998-4 (1998); see also N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 03-45 (2003) (participation in a “ride along” program violates the judge’s obligation to uphold judicial integrity and impartiality and avoid the appearance of impropriety). Simply put, a judge should not jeopardize public confidence in judicial impartiality by seeking or accepting an invitation to participate in a police “ride-along” program any more than a judge should jeopardize judicial impartiality by seeking or accepting an invitation to spend a day with a landlord or the president of a tenants’ union.

In addition, by riding with a police officer a judge becomes a witness to every traffic stop, arrest, and other interaction with the public. If called to testify concerning any of those encounters, the judge will likely appear to lend the prestige of office to the party who subpoenaed the judge. See United States v. Frankenthal, 582 F.2d 1102, 1108 (7th Cir. 1978) (recognizing that the possibility that the prestige of judicial office may be imparted to the party calling a judge as a witness “cannot lightly be dismissed”).  Finally, accompanying a law enforcement officer during the officer’s shift may convey the impression that law enforcement is in a position to influence the judge. See Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 62B (“[N]or should a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special positon to influence the judge.”); see also Utah Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 97-5 (1997) (concluding that riding with a police officer creates an appearance of impartiality and may also create the impression that law enforcement is in a position to influence the judge).

Conclusion

Participating in a police “ride-along” program erodes public trust in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary and therefore violates Illinois Supreme Court Rule 62.