Opinion No. 01-04
May 1, 2001
Topic: Judge receiving award at a charitable organization's dinner.
Digest: A judge may not receive an award at a charitable organization's dinner if fund-raising will be conducted at the event.
References: Illinois Supreme Court Rule 65B(2); Illinois Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion Nos. 93-4, 96-3, 96-4; New York Advisory Opinions 94-16, 88-9; and Pennsylvania Advisory Opinion 14 (1974).
FACTS
Two judges, a city council member, and a school board member have been invited to attend a public dinner sponsored by a charitable organization for the purpose of receiving a plaque recognizing their commitment to public service. The price of the dinner tickets will only cover the cost of the food, but during the dinner "pledge cards" seeking financial donations by attendees will be distributed. Also, the keynote speaker will explain the work accomplished by the organization and urge the attendees to be generous in their support. Approximately 200 people normally attend the yearly dinner.
QUESTION
May a judge receive a plaque at an award dinner for a charitable organization which recognizes the judge's commitment to public service? At the dinner, pledge cards will be distributed.
OPINION
In the context of educational, religious, charitable, fraternal and civic organizations, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 65(B)2 provides in part that:
A judge should not be a speaker or the guest of honor at an organization's fund-raising events, but he or she may attend such events.
The first issue is whether by receiving a plaque recognizing a commitment to public service at a public dinner, the judge becomes the "guest of honor" at the event.
Generally speaking, a person receiving an award or special recognition at a public or private event is considered a "guest of honor" at the event. See Pennsylvania Advisory Opinion 14 (1974) (an award recipient is considered a "guest of honor"); New York Advisory Opinion 94-16 )judge may not receive an award in recognition of an interest in children at fund-raising dinner); New York Advisory Opinion 88-9 (Supreme Court Justice should decline accepting a plaque for public service presented at a civic association's annual dinner). Here, the judges have been invited to the dinner for the purpose of bestowing upon them a special distinction for their commitment to public service. As such, they would be guests of honor at the dinner.
The second issue is whether the dinner is a fund-raising event. If it is not, there is no prohibition against a judge being honored at the dinner. See Illinois Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion 93-4 (a judge may be a speaker or honoree at a dinner which is not a fund-raiser so long as the judge's attendance does not compromise the judge's independence or integrity).
Although the ticket price will only cover the cost of the meal, there are clearly fund-raising aspects to the dinner. Pledge cards will be distributed requesting the attendees to commit to a financial contribution and the keynote speaker will reinforce the solicitation of funds. These facts establish that the dinner is primarily a fund-raising event under Rule 65B(2), the primary purpose of the event is to urge people to contribute. The result would be different if the fund-raising were merely incidental to the event. Moreover, it should be noted that this event differs from events where the ticket price includes a contribution. In those events, there is a coercive pressure to contribute: it is evident who contributed by who attends. In this event, the contribution is discrete and private. It is only because the primary purpose of the event is fund raising that a judge is prohibited from being the guest of honor. Because of the fund-raising nature of the event, a judge cannot be a speaker, introduce an honoree or speaker, or be an honoree at the dinner. See Illinois Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion No. 96-3.
As in Illinois Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion No. 96-4, the Committee does not address the significant potential constitutional issues relating to claims of religious freedom being infringed upon by the Code of Judicial Conduct's prohibition against soliciting funds for religious organizations.
